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PAY PHONE PROTECTIONS
IN A SMARTPHONE SOCIETY:
THE NEED TO RESTRICT
SEARCHES OF MODERN TECHNOLOGY
INCIDENT TO ARREST
Marty Koresawa*
Since their development in the 1980s, cell phones have become
ubiquitous in modern society. Today, cell phones feature large datastorage capacities and can access various types of personal media,
making them pocket-sized windows into intimate aspects of an
individual’s life. Yet many courts treat cell phones as if they were
ordinary physical containers, allowing police officers to search the
contents of an arrestee’s cell phone incident to an arrest. The
warrantless search of electronic devices incident to an arrest, however,
cannot be justified on the same grounds as a similar search of physical
containers. The government does not have a strong interest in searching
a cell phone incident to an arrest because the search is exceedingly
unlikely to reveal a concealed weapon or prevent the destruction of
evidence. Moreover, given the personal nature of cell phones,
individuals have a much greater expectation of privacy in their cell
phones than they do in physical containers stored on their persons. This
Note argues that search of a cell phone incident to arrest should no
longer be blindly governed by the same precedent that controls other
searches incident to arrest, and it urges the Supreme Court to engage in
a fresh and thoughtful balancing of the interests at stake. Only by
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creating new doctrine can the Supreme Court adequately protect these
important interests and restore fidelity to the Fourth Amendment
principles that should govern searches incident to arrest.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1968, Officer Richard Jenks pulled over and arrested Willie
Robinson for driving without a license.1 Incident to the arrest and
pursuant to police department instructions, Officer Jenks conducted a
search of Robinson’s person.2 Jenks reached into the breast pocket of
Robinson’s coat and discovered a crumpled-up cigarette package.3
When he looked inside the package, Jenks found fourteen “gelatin
capsules of white powder which he thought to be, and which later
analysis proved to be, heroin.”4
In United States v. Robinson,5 the United States Supreme Court
held that Officer Jenks’s conduct in looking inside the cigarette
package was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The Court
stated that because of “the need to disarm the suspect in order to take
him into custody” and “to preserve evidence on [the suspect’s]
person for later use at trial,”6 officers may search an arrestee and
open any containers that they find on the arrestee’s person.7 While
the search of a small container like the cigarette package discovered
on an arrestee like Robinson might not raise any alarming Fourth
Amendment concerns, the Robinson Court’s decision has had a
tremendous impact on modern case law.
In 2007, in People v. Diaz,8 police officers set up a controlled
purchase of ecstasy.9 Gregory Diaz, responsible for driving the
ecstasy seller to the meeting where the exchange would take place,
was arrested by officers upon his arrival. While conducting a search
incident to the arrest, the officers discovered and seized a cell phone
from Diaz’s pocket.10 Thereafter, the officers searched the
defendant’s phone, found a text message that said “6 4 80” and used
that message to obtain a confession from Diaz.11 The California
Supreme Court in Diaz held that pursuant to U.S. Supreme Court
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 220 (1973).
Id. at 221–22.
Id. at 221–23.
Id.
414 U.S. 218 (1973).
See id. at 234.
See id. at 236.
244 P.3d 501 (Cal. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 94 (2011).
Id. at 502.
Id.
Id. at 502–03.
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precedent, the Fourth Amendment did not prohibit officers from
searching Diaz’s cell phone.12 The Diaz court loosely analogized cell
phones to items like the cigarette package in Robinson to justify its
decision.13 It went on to say that the propriety of a search incident to
arrest did not depend on the character of the item searched.14
The search of a drug dealer’s phone, the very device used to
carry out drug sale transactions, may not sound shocking or
outrageous. However, the Diaz court’s reasoning in justifying the
search through its loose analogy to a cigarette package raises one
important question: Had Officer Jenks discovered a cell phone in
Willie Robinson’s pocket, and not a cigarette package, would the
U.S. Supreme Court have approved the search of a text message
folder incident to arrest?
This Note argues that analogizing cell phones to physical
containers, like the cigarette package in Robinson, is faulty and
results in severe Fourth Amendment violations of privacy. These
intrusions signify the need to revisit the decisions governing searches
incident to arrest so that future courts will not continue eroding
Fourth Amendment protections.
Part II discusses the background of Fourth Amendment
principles, the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine, and the doctrine’s
application to advancing technology. Part III discusses how applying
the principles of Robinson to cell phones is inherently flawed, and it
critiques the way that lower courts have been willing to apply
precedent to rationalize warrantless searches of cell phones incident
to arrest. Finally, Part IV explores potential solutions that would
place much-needed limitations on searches incident to arrest.
II. BACKGROUND
Cell phones have become ubiquitous in modern society,15
morphing from two-pound portable communication devices into
pocket-sized computers with massive capabilities.16 As a result, the
12. Id. at 511.
13. Id. at 505–06.
14. Id. at 506.
15. As of June 2012, 321.7 million wireless subscriptions existed in the United States. CTIA
Consumer Info: U.S. Wireless Quick Facts, CTIA, http://www.ctia.org/consumer_info/index.cfm/
AID/10323 (last visited Dec. 20, 2012).
16. In 1973, Motorola developed a prototype of the first cell phone, which measured over a
foot long, weighed almost two pounds, and could store approximately thirty phone numbers.
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collision between advancing technology and the Fourth Amendment
was inevitable.17 The following discussion examines the case law
that governs the basic principles behind Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence and searches incident to arrest, and it considers the
application of those principles toward recently emerging
technologies.
A. General Fourth Amendment Principles
The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches of
“persons, houses, papers, and effects.”18 The Supreme Court has
interpreted the Fourth Amendment to govern police conduct that
either physically invades an area enumerated in the Fourth
Amendment or infringes on a person’s justifiable expectation of
privacy.19
In Katz v. United States,20 the Court held that the Fourth
Amendment prohibited attaching a wiretap to the outside of a public
telephone booth because it intruded on the defendant’s justifiable
expectation of privacy.21 Justice Harlan, in his concurrence, provided
a two-prong test to determine what constitutes a reasonable
expectation of privacy: (1) the person has a subjective expectation of
privacy; and (2) society is willing to recognize that expectation.22
Generally, this expectation of privacy requires government
agents to obtain a warrant based on probable cause before they can
search anything protected under the provisions of the Fourth
Amendment.23 These provisions restrict state action in the following
ways:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
Liane Cassavoy, In Pictures: A History of Cell Phones, at 1 of 16, PCWORLD (May 7, 2007, 1:00
AM),
http://www.pcworld.com/article/131450/in_pictures_a_history_of_cell_phones.html.
Modern-day smartphones are capable of far greater data storage and data access capabilities. See,
e.g., iPhone: Technical Specifications, APPLE, http://support.apple.com/kb/sp2 (last modified
Feb. 19, 2010).
17. See, e.g., Diaz, 244 P.3d at 503–04.
18. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
19. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949–51 (2012).
20. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
21. Id. at 353.
22. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
23. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.24
The Fourth Amendment is not an absolute demand for a warrant
or probable cause. The touchstone of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence is that searches must be reasonable.25 A warrantless
search may withstand Fourth Amendment scrutiny if “the
governmental interest [that] allegedly justifies official intrusion”
outweighs “the constitutionally protected [privacy] interests of the
private citizen.”26
Courts have delineated the factors and principles that should be
considered to determine the weight of the privacy interest and the
weight of the governmental need. These factors include society’s
expectation of privacy,27 the officer’s safety,28 the risk of losing
evidence,29 and the need for clear rules that are easily applied.30 The
Supreme Court has also stated that “[t]he scope of [a] search must be
strictly tied to and justified by the circumstances which rendered its
initiation permissible.”31
B. Searches Incident to Arrest
One exception to the warrant and probable cause requirements is
searches incident to arrest.32 The Court in Chimel v. California33 was
the first to articulate the modern-day conception of a search incident
to an arrest.34 In Chimel, police officers arrested the defendant at his

24. Id.
25. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 353 (“[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people—and not simply
‘areas’—against unreasonable searches and seizures.” (emphasis added)).
26. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20–21 (1968).
27. California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 391 (1985); Terry, 392 U.S. at 24–25.
28. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762–63 (1969); Terry, 392 U.S. at 23.
29. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 762–63; Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1856 (2011).
30. Acevedo v. California, 500 U.S. 565, 576 (1991); see United States v. Robinson, 414
U.S. 218, 235 (1973) (creating a categorical authority to searches incident to arrest because
officers make “quick ad hoc judgment[s]” in the field).
31. Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 (internal quotation marks omitted).
32. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 224 (“It is well settled that a search incident to a lawful arrest is a
traditional exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment.”).
33. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
34. Adam M. Gershowitz, The iPhone Meets the Fourth Amendment, 56 UCLA L. REV. 27,
33 (2008).
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home on burglary charges.35 A subsequent search of the defendant’s
entire three-bedroom home led officers to discover evidence that
linked the defendant to the burglary.36 The Supreme Court held that
the search of the defendant’s home was unconstitutional because the
rationale underlying the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine could not
justify a search of the defendant’s entire home.37
The Court in Chimel reasoned that two compelling needs
justified a search incident to an arrest: first, the need for officers to
disarm an arrestee; and second, the need to prevent the concealment
or destruction of evidence.38 The Court recognized that searches
incident to arrest may extend to areas where an arrestee may obtain a
weapon or destructible evidence.39 However, a full search of an
arrestee’s house would extend beyond these areas and violate the
main evil that the Fourth Amendment sought to proscribe: “general
warrants and warrantless searches that had so alienated the
colonists.”40
The language in Chimel resulted in some confusion about
whether the Court restricted the use of these searches only to
situations in which the search would promote officer safety or
prevent the loss of evidence that was material to the arrest, or
whether the Court granted officers a categorical right to search an
arrestee.41 The Chimel Court stressed that a warrantless search
should be no more intrusive than is necessary to address the concerns
that justify the departure from the Fourth Amendment’s warrant and
probable cause requirements.42 However, the plain language of the

35. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 753.
36. Id. at 754.
37. Id. at 768.
38. Id. at 762–63.
39. Id. at 763.
40. Id. at 761, 765–66.
41. Wayne A. Logan, An Exception Swallows a Rule: Police Authority to Search Incident to
Arrest, 19 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 381, 392 (2010). In Chimel, the Court states the following:
[I]t is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person arrested in order to
remove any weapons that the latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect
his escape. Otherwise, the officer’s safety might well be endangered, and the arrest
itself frustrated. In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search
for and seize any evidence on the arrestee’s person in order to prevent its concealment
or destruction.
Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763.
42. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 764 (citing Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 67 (1967)).
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opinion would suggest that the Court authorized officers to search an
arrestee for any purpose incident to a lawful custodial arrest.43 Put
differently, the “bare fact of arrest” grants officers a right to search
an arrestee.44
In United States v. Robinson, the Supreme Court ruled that
searches incident to arrest were per se reasonable, placing significant
weight on the need for administrable Fourth Amendment limitations
in stressful and uncertain situations.45 In Robinson, an officer
arrested the defendant for operating a vehicle without a license.46
When the officer subsequently searched the defendant, he found a
“crumpled up cigarette package” in the breast pocket of the
defendant’s coat.47 Looking inside the package, the officer found
what later turned out to be heroin.48
The Court overturned the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit decision to suppress the evidence.49 The appellate
court relied heavily on the Supreme Court’s decision in Terry v.
Ohio,50 reasoning that all searches must be “no more intrusive” than
the justifications for initiating the search allow.51 The appellate court
reasoned that the search could not be justified by an evidentiary
purpose52 and that the officer had already recovered the only
evidence related to the crime that triggered the arrest that “he could
possibly have had probable cause to believe was in the arrestee’s
possession.”53
The appellate court further held that searches incident to arrest
that were justified only by the need to disarm an arrestee must be
limited to a frisk unless “circumstances . . . give the officer
reasonable grounds to believe that the person with whom he is

43. Id. at 763.
44. Logan, supra note 41, at 392.
45. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234 n.5, 235 (1973).
46. Id. at 220.
47. Id. at 223.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 236.
50. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
51. United States v. Robinson, 471 F.2d 1082, 1094 (D.C. Cir. 1972), rev’d, 414 U.S. 218.
52. Id. at 1095.
53. Id. at 1094. Officer Jenks pulled over Robinson after witnessing him driving a vehicle,
and Jenks had reason to believe Robinson’s license had been revoked. Id. at 1088. Therefore, the
only evidence the officer needed or could possibly have found was the fraudulent temporary
driver’s permit that he had already obtained. Id. at 1093.
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dealing is armed and presently dangerous.”54 The court
acknowledged that while a frisk may not uncover all weapons and
would not eliminate all conceivable danger to the officer, it would
uncover a majority of weapons. Additionally, the balancing of police
and privacy interests favored limiting weapons searches to frisks
unless other reasons supported a more intrusive search.55
The Supreme Court rejected the appellate court’s reasoning and
established a bright-line rule that authorized officers to search an
arrestee’s person as well as the contents of any containers found on
an arrestee’s person.56 The Robinson Court reasoned that because an
officer’s extended exposure to an arrestee during a custodial arrest
posed a significantly greater risk than during a brief investigative
stop, all custodial arrests justified a full search of the person, even if
the offense of arrest was a mere traffic violation.57 The Robinson
Court rejected a subjective rule that would force officers to assess the
probability that an arrestee possessed weapons or evidence and stated
that a lawful arrest is sufficient to justify a search of the arrestee’s
person.58
Accordingly, Robinson stands for the proposition that searches
of the person are automatically permissible after an arrest and need
not be supported by the underlying justifications espoused in
Chimel.59 Subsequent cases have applied Robinson and its progeny to
justify searches of wallets and address books found on an arrestee’s
person.60
C. Technology and the Search Incident to Arrest
The Fourth Amendment’s clash with technology is not
something that the Founders could have foreseen. As new

54. Id. at 1097.
55. Id. at 1099–1101.
56. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973).
57. Id. at 234–35.
58. Id. at 235.
59. Gershowitz, supra note 34, at 34; Chelsea Oxton, Note, The Search Incident to Arrest
Exception Plays Catch Up: Why Police May No Longer Search Cell Phones Incident to Arrest
Without a Warrant, 43 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1157, 1167 (2011).
60. See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez, 995 F.2d 776, 778 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that a
search of a wallet and address book incident to arrest was valid); see also United States v. Lynch,
908 F. Supp. 284, 288 (D.V.I. 1995) (citing numerous cases upholding searches of wallets and
address books incident to arrest across various circuits).
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technologies emerge, courts have placed great emphasis on the
personal and intrusive capabilities of technologies.61 Both state and
federal courts, however, have generally been hesitant to differentiate
modern devices that store electronic data from more conventional
items.62 Courts have either made a direct analogy to conventional
containers based on functional equivalence or entirely disregarded
the nature and quality of a particular item.63
1. Searches of Pagers Incident to Arrest
In United States v. Chan,64 an undercover DEA agent met with a
drug dealer in a motel room to purchase heroin.65 The drug dealer,
using the motel telephone, paged the defendant and arranged for a
delivery of heroin.66 After the defendant made the delivery, the
agents arrested him and seized an inactive pager from his person.67
The agents activated the pager and thereafter retrieved several
telephone numbers that connected the defendant to the drug dealer in
the motel room.68
The court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the
evidence that the DEA agents retrieved from his pager.69 The court
compared the pager to a closed container and concluded that the
Fourth Amendment did not prohibit the agent’s search of the

61. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (“We think that obtaining by
sense-enhancing technology any information regarding the interior of a home that could not
otherwise be obtained without ‘physical intrusion into a constitutionally protected area’
constitutes a search—at least where (as here) the technology in question is not in general public
use.” (internal citation omitted)); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967) (“To read the
Constitution [to not protect telephone booths] is to ignore the vital role that the public telephone
has come to play in private communication.”).
62. See United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 260 (5th Cir. 2007) (holding that a cell-phone
search incident to arrest was valid because police had the authority to search any containers
immediately associated with the person during an arrest); United States v. Chan, 830 F. Supp.
531, 535 (N.D. Cal. 1993); People v. Balint, 41 Cal. Rptr. 3d 211, 218 (Ct. App. 2006) (“We
perceive no reasonable basis to distinguish between records stored electronically on the laptop
and documents placed in a filing cabinet or information stored in a microcassette.”).
63. See, e.g., United States v. Arnold, 533 F.3d 1003, 1009–10 (9th Cir. 2008); Chan, 830 F.
Supp. at 535; Hawkins v. State, 704 S.E.2d 886, 891 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010), aff’d, 723 S.E.2d 924
(Ga. 2012) (stating that cell phones should be considered a “container that stores thousands of
individual containers”).
64. 830 F. Supp. 531 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
65. Id. at 532–33.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 536.
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defendant’s pager because the pager was searched incident to
arrest.70 The court relied on New York v. Belton,71 which stated that a
closed container “may . . . be searched whether it is open or closed,”
to support its conclusion that the search was valid.72 The court
conceded that “there was no danger that [the defendant] would in any
way produce a weapon from the pager, and probably no threat that he
would access the pager to destroy evidence,” but it still found the
search constitutional because it considered the pager to be a
container.73
Subsequent cases analyzed that very same issue and arrived at
the same conclusion.74 In United States v. Ortiz,75 the court upheld
the retrieval of telephone numbers from a pager recovered incident to
arrest.76 However, the court in Ortiz, while agreeing with the
decision in Chan, paid particular attention to the specific
characteristics of the pager that connected it to one of the
justifications behind a search incident to arrest.77 Specifically, the
court noted that because a pager has a finite amount of memory, the
data could be lost due to incoming messages, and in some cases,
turning off a pager could erase its memory.78 Accordingly, these
characteristics suggested that evidence was at risk of being lost and
justified the officer’s search of the pager.
While the use of pagers has become a rarity in our society, now
replaced by cell phones and more sophisticated technological
devices,79 these cases continue to be relevant today. The pager cases
laid the framework for analyzing the propriety of searches of cell
phones incident to arrest.80

70. Id. at 534–36.
71. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
72. Chan, 830 F. Supp. at 535.
73. Id. at 536.
74. Gershowitz, supra note 34, at 37.
75. 84 F.3d 977 (7th Cir. 1996).
76. Id. at 984.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Gershowitz, supra note 34, at 38.
80. See, e.g., United States v. McCray, No. CR408-231, 2009 WL 29607, at *3 (S.D. Ga.
Jan. 5, 2009) (“[L]aw enforcement officers have the authority to immediately ‘search’ or retrieve,
incident to a valid arrest, information from a pager in order to prevent its destruction as
evidence.” (quoting Oritz, 84 F. 3d at 984)).
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2. Searches of Cell Phones Incident to Arrest
When addressing the search of cell phones incident to arrest,
many courts have followed a line of reasoning similar to that used in
the pager cases.81 Like the pager cases, the central question regarding
an officer’s authority to search a cell phone pursuant to Robinson
remains the same: whether a device containing digital data is a
“container” as contemplated by the Robinson Court.82 However, the
reasoning has become far more strained, since courts have shown
their willingness to simply ignore the key features that make the
analogy work.83 Although one court described cell phones as novel
objects that defy easy categorization,84 most courts have continued to
validate the analogy of cell phones to containers.85
For example, in United States v. Finley,86 the court accepted the
government’s argument that a cell phone is like a closed container.87
Therefore, the court found that pursuant to Robinson, the cell phone
fell within the scope of a search incident to arrest.88 Similar to the
way the Chan court treated the pager, the Finley court treated the cell
phone as if it were a physical container.89 The Court of Appeals of
Georgia in Hawkins v. State90 also applied similar reasoning, but
instead of treating cell phones as traditional containers, it treated the
cell phone as a container with many containers inside.91

81. Id. (citing “recent cases [that] have treated mobile telephones and digital cameras in the
same manner” as pagers).
82. Smallwood v. State, 61 So. 3d 448, 459 (Fl. Dist. Ct. App.), cert. granted, 68 So. 3d 235
(Fla. 2011).
83. See, e.g., United States v. Murphy, 552 F.3d 405, 411 (4th Cir. 2009).
84. State v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d 949, 955 (Ohio 2009) (“Given their unique nature as
multifunctional tools, cell phones defy easy categorization.”).
85. See, e.g., United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 260 (5th Cir. 2007) (accepting the
defendant’s argument that a cell phone is like a closed container); Hawkins v. State, 704 S.E.2d
886, 891 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010) (treating a cell phone as a container containing many containers),
aff’d, 723 S.E.2d 924, 925–26 (Ga. 2012).
86. 477 F.3d 250 (5th Cir. 2007).
87. Id. at 259.
88. Id.
89. Compare id. at 260 (holding that the search of the cell phone was lawful because “[t]he
permissible scope of a search incident to a lawful arrest extends to containers found on the
arrestee’s person”), with United States v. Chan, 830 F. Supp. 531, 536 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (holding
that the search of the pager was lawful because the pager was a container that was seized incident
to arrest).
90. 704 S.E.2d 886, 891 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010).
91. Id. at 891.
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Other cases indirectly relate cell phones to the pager-container
cases by focusing on the similar functions of pagers and cell phones.
In United States v. Murphy,92 the court upheld the search of text
messages stored in the defendant’s cell phone incident to arrest.93
The court, citing to Ortiz to support its decision,94 explained that, like
pagers, the information stored on a cell phone was volatile; as a
result, the officer’s search of the cell phone was justified to preserve
evidence.95 However, the court also suggested that data volatility did
not depend on storage capacity,96 diverting from the rationale used in
Ortiz, which was premised on the limited nature of a pager’s
memory.97
Other courts have employed far simpler analogies that disregard
the nature and quantity of the information contained in cell phones
altogether. Rather than analogize a cell phone to a container by
function, these courts have been willing to equate any object to a
cigarette package, as long as the object is found on the arrestee’s
person;98 one such case was People v. Diaz.99
In Diaz, officers arrested the defendant for suspected drug
dealing.100 When the officers seized the defendant’s cell phone
incident to arrest and searched its text message inbox, they found
evidence of a drug deal.101 The defendant moved to suppress the
evidence recovered from his cell phone.102
The Supreme Court of California affirmed the denial of the
defendant’s motion.103 The court relied on U.S. Supreme Court
decisions that justified the search of any container found on the
person.104 While the court acknowledged the vast amount of
information that is stored on cell phones as compared to other
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
(2011).
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

552 F.3d 405 (4th Cir. 2009).
Id. at 411.
Id. (citing United States v. Ortiz, 84 F.3d 977, 984 (7th Cir. 1996)).
Id.
Murphy, 552 F.3d at 411.
Ortiz, 84 F.3d at 984.
See, e.g., People v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501, 506–07 (Cal. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 94
Id.
Id. at 502.
Id. at 502–03.
Id. at 503.
Id. at 511.
Id. at 506–07.
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containers, it nevertheless held that the nature of the object was
irrelevant for Fourth Amendment analysis.105
In contrast, some courts have reasoned that the nature of the data
stored within cell phones is critical to the Fourth Amendment
analysis.106 For example, in State v. Smith,107 the Supreme Court of
Ohio suppressed the evidence that was recovered from the
defendant’s cell phone.108 The court abandoned the reasoning of the
pager cases and rejected the government’s analogy that a cell phone
is a closed container.109 The court relied on New York v. Belton,
which defined a closed container as “any object capable of holding
another object.”110 The Smith court continued that the contents of an
electronic device are “wholly unlike any physical object found
within a closed container,” and it held that a cell phone was not a
closed container as contemplated by Robinson.111
The flaw in the Diaz court’s rationale becomes apparent when
one considers cell-phone-search cases like Smith, in which the court
recognized that applying Robinson to modern devices conflicts with
the underlying principles of the Fourth Amendment.112 The searchincident-to-arrest doctrine and other Fourth Amendment exceptions
are based on the premise that the governmental interest outweighs
the privacy concerns of private citizens.113
III. CRITIQUE
A. Robinson and Its Progeny
Should Not Control Searches of
Cell Phones Incident to Arrest
Cases that authorize warrantless searches of cell phones incident
to arrest often rely on Robinson to support their conclusions.114
105. Id.
106. See, e.g., Schlossberg v. Solesbee, 844 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1167–70 (D. Or. Jan. 18,
2012); Smallwood v. State, 61 So. 3d 448, 461 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011); State v. Smith, 920
N.E.2d 949, 956 (Ohio 2009). .
107. 920 N.E.2d 949 (Ohio 2009).
108. Id. at 956.
109. Id. at 953–54.
110. Id. at 954 (quoting New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 n.4 (1981)).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 956.
113. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20–21 (1968).
114. See, e.g., United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 259–60 (5th Cir. 2007); People v. Diaz,
244 P.3d 501, 505–06 (Cal. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 94 (2011).
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However, the analogies to Robinson that courts use in these cases fail
to account for the key characteristics of cell phones that make
Robinson inapplicable.
1. Robinson’s Scope Was Limited
by the Physical Restrictions Inherent in
the Technology Available at That Time
One scholar has appropriately criticized the courts’ use of
functional analogies to equate cell phones to standard containers,
stating that this mode of analysis “leads courts to deviate over time
(and often subconsciously) from the intended arc of precedent.”115 In
order to avoid such faulty analogies, courts must account for any
implied limitations of prior decisions when considering whether
functional analogies are appropriate.116 One such implicit limitation
has been the physical limits of containers at the time of the decision.
Although the Supreme Court did not explicitly define a
“container” as “any object capable of holding another object” until
Belton in 1981,117 the historical context of Robinson strongly
suggests that the Court’s holding considered only physical objects.118
A search of a pocket-sized container would have a natural limit to its
invasiveness because only so much information could physically be
in someone’s pocket. Additionally, the Supreme Court viewed the
nature of what could be found as far less personal,119 unlike the
communications, photos, contacts, and other information regularly

115. Luke M. Milligan, Analogy Breakers: A Reality Check on Emerging Technologies, 80
MISS. L.J. 1319, 1328–30 (2011).
116. Id. at 1332–33.
117. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 461 n.4 (1981). By the time the Court decided Belton
on July 1, 1981, cell phones were already in the headlines. FCC Plans to Give AT&T Large Share
of Mobile Phone Market, WALL ST. J., Apr. 9, 1981. Therefore, the fact that Belton defined
containers as “any object capable of holding another object” once portable electronic devices
began to impact the United States supports an inference that the Court intended not to adjudicate
rules regarding electronic devices until after it understood the capabilities of the devices.
118. This Note adopts Belton’s definition of a physical container as “any object capable of
holding another object.” Belton, 453 U.S. at 461 n.4. A physical object is defined as a tangible
item.
119. Cf. Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 303 (1999) (quoting Cardwell v. Lewis, 417
U.S. 583, 590 (1974) (stating that vehicles "seldom serve as . . . the repository of personal effects"
(alteration in original)).
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stored on modern cell phones that could reveal the intimate details of
one’s life.120
Moreover, a rule that treats searches incident to arrest as per se
reasonable, as adopted in Robinson, would be highly inconsistent
with Fourth Amendment principles unless the Robinson Court
presumed the privacy interests at stake were minimal. The dissent in
Robinson pointed out that under the majority’s reasoning, even when
the likelihood of finding weapons is highly remote, officers would be
granted authority to conduct highly intrusive searches.121 However,
the examples cited to by the dissent—wallets and an attorney’s
envelope122—either have only limited personal information or are
anecdotal. Thus, the level of intrusion that the Robinson Court
authorized was categorically minimal, and even when accounting for
instances in which the government need was trivial, the searches
would be reasonable overall.
At the very least, the Supreme Court did not and could not
contemplate that searches incident to arrest could potentially intrude
into unlimited private information. Because the development of cell
phones did not take off until after Robinson, the court could not have
foreseen the vast and widespread use of technologies available in
today’s society.123 These technological advancements have allowed
the average amount and personal nature of information within a

120. See, e.g., Schlossberg v. Solesbee, 844 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1169–70 (D. Or. Jan. 18, 2012)
(noting that in Newhard v. Borders, 649 F. Supp. 2d 440 (W.D. Va. 2009), officers found intimate
pictures of the owner’s girlfriend stored on his cell phone); Smallwood v. State, 61 So. 3d 448,
460–61 (Fl. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (“[C]ell phones can make the entirety of one’s personal life
available for perusing by an officer every time someone is arrested for any offense. It seems this
result could not have been contemplated or intended by the Robinson court.”).
121. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 256–57 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(“Would it be reasonable for the police officer, because of the possibility that a razor blade was
hidden somewhere in the wallet, to open it, remove all the contents, and examine each item
carefully? Or suppose a lawyer lawfully arrested for a traffic offense is found to have a sealed
envelope on his person. Would it be permissible for the arresting officer to tear open the envelope
in order to make sure that it did not contain a clandestine weapon—perhaps a pin or a razor
blade?”).
122. Id.
123. Technology Timeline: 1752–1990, PUB. BROAD. SERV., http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/
telephone/timeline/timeline_text.html (last visited Sept. 26, 2011). In the 1970s, the FCC was still
in the process of approving cell phone systems. SRI International, The Cellular Telephone, in
THE ROLE OF NSF'S SUPPORT OF ENGINEERING IN ENABLING TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION–
PHASE II (David Roessner ed., 1998). The first smartphones were capable of accessing the
Internet, running programs, and storing massive amounts of data, Cassavoy, supra note 16, at 3 of
16, and became available to consumers in 2001. Id. at 6 of 16.
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person’s pocket today to far exceed what the Court could have
expected at the time it decided Robinson.
However, many courts continue to discount the importance of
physicality and analogize cell phones to conventional items.124 Some
courts even disregard the nature of the item altogether, without ever
questioning whether a 1970s decision should apply to twenty-first
century technology.125 This faulty application of Robinson has led
courts to ratify highly invasive police conduct that is inconsistent
with the Fourth Amendment.126
2. Robinson Sought to Eliminate
Quick, Ad Hoc Judgments in the Field
in Order to Maximize Officer Safety
When dealing specifically with physical containers, officers face
an inherently uncertain situation because the presence of weapons or
destructible evidence is unclear.127 This inherent uncertainty is
precisely what necessitated the per se rule established in Robinson.
The Robinson Court established this rule to prevent officers in
the field from being forced to determine in ambiguous circumstances
whether a search falls within a recognized exception.128 The two
underlying rationales that justify a search incident to arrest are to
disarm arrestees and to prevent the destruction of evidence.129 When
the Court decided that a search incident to arrest was per se
reasonable, the Court relied heavily on a policy rationale that police
officers should not have to predict how courts would define the
permissible scope of a search incident to arrest in ambiguous
situations.130
The Supreme Court has often established bright-line rules to
ensure police officers have a clear understanding of the scope of their
124. See, e.g., People v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501, 506 (Cal. 2011) (stating that the relevant high
court decisions do not “depend[] on the item’s character”), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 94 (2011).
125. Id.; see, e.g., United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 259–60 (5th Cir. 2007). But see
Smallwood, 61 So. 3d at 461.
126. Smallwood, 61 So. 3d at 461 (“[C]ell phones can make the entirety of one’s personal life
available for perusing by an officer every time someone is arrested for any offense. It seems this
result could not have been contemplated or intended by the Robinson court.”).
127. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 234–35 & n.5.
128. Id. at 235.
129. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762–63 (1969).
130. Id.
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authority.131 Bright-line rules reduce officer hesitation in the field
that may endanger the officer or lead to less effective law
enforcement.132 Although the Robinson Court acknowledged the
need to prevent the destruction of evidence,133 its analysis suggests
that its primary concern was to ensure that officers could disarm an
arrestee to protect themselves from physical injury without fear that
valuable evidence would later be suppressed in court.134
The Robinson Court maximized officer safety by allowing
officers to fully inspect any item no matter how innocuous it may
appear externally.135 As a consequence, the Court also allowed
officers to seize any and all evidence that could be destroyed.136
However, unlike physical objects, the data stored on cell phones
cannot contain a clandestine weapon. Because cell phones only store
electronic data, courts have recognized that cell phones do not
implicate officer-safety concerns.137 Therefore, the primary reason
behind Robinson’s bright-line rule—officer safety—is inapplicable.
3. Cell Phones Do Not Implicate
the Evidentiary Concerns Underlying
Searches Incident to Arrest
In light of the fact that cell phones do not implicate officersafety concerns, the only remaining justification to search arrestees
incident to an arrest is to prevent the loss of evidence. However, the

131. See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 347 (2001) (“Fourth Amendment
balance is not well served by standards requiring sensitive, case-by-case determinations of
government need, lest every discretionary judgment in the field be converted into an occasion for
constitutional review.”); Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 453 (1994) (holding that an
ambiguous request for an attorney does not cease questioning because to impose such a rule
would force officers to make difficult judgment calls about the suspect’s desire for an attorney);
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 822 n.30 (1982) (expressing concern over “[t]he propriety of
the warrantless search . . . turn[ing] on an objective appraisal of all the surrounding
circumstances”); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 459–60 (1981) (holding that incident to a
lawful arrest, police officers may search the entire passenger compartment of a vehicle, resolving
a conflict of authorities that reach different conclusions in similar factual circumstances).
132. Cf. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 595–96 (2006) (discussing the consequences of
applying the exclusionary rule to a knock-and-announce violation).
133. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973).
134. See id. at 234–35.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 234.
137. See, e.g., United States v. Park, No. CR 05-375 SI, 2007 WL 1521573, at *9 (N.D. Cal.
May 23, 2007).
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electronic data stored on a cell phone are different from physical
evidence because, as a general matter, they cannot be destroyed.
Unlike physical evidence, electronic data cannot become
irrecoverable.138 Courts have reasoned that text messages and call
logs stored on a cell phone are volatile because incoming
communications may erase the existing information.139 Remote-wipe
applications that allow users to delete data remotely increase this
concern.140 However, any deleted evidence is not permanently lost
because a cell phone’s deleted data may still be recovered.141
Courts and scholars have recognized this fact.142 Call records
and text messages are available from the service provider.143 Even if
service providers do not keep such information, when a user deletes
data on a cell phone, the device marks that data to be overwritten if
necessary.144 This “deleted” data actually remain on a cell phone
until new data overwrites them.145 New devices are capable of
138. See United States v. James, No. 1:06CR134 CDP, 2008 WL 1925032, at *7 n.3 (E.D.
Mo. Apr. 29, 2008); Matthew E. Orso, Cellular Phones, Warrantless Searches, and the New
Frontier of Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 183, 199–200 (2010).
139. See, e.g., United States v. Valdez, No. 06-CR-336, 2008 WL 360548, at *3–4 (E.D. Wis.
Feb. 8, 2008) (finding that “call histories on cell phones could be deleted or lost, giving rise to a
legitimate concern about destruction of evidence”); United States v. Parada, 289 F. Supp. 2d
1291, 1303–04 (D. Kan. 2003) (finding that cell phones have limited memory and therefore
incoming calls could overwrite earlier stored numbers). However, one court stated that text
messages are not volatile because they will remain on the cell phone unless the user deletes them.
United States v. Wall, No. 08-60016-CR, 2008 WL 5381412, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 22, 2008).
140. Ashley B. Snyder, The Fourth Amendment and Warrantless Cell Phone Searches: When
Is Your Cell Phone Protected?, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 155, 179 (2011); see also Kevin
McLaughlin, McAfee Unveils Strategy to Secure Mobile Devices, Data, Apps, CRN (Sept. 20,
2011, 8:44PM ), www.crn.com/news/security/231601800/mcafee-unveils-strategy-to-securemobile-devices-data-apps.htm (“One example on the consumer side is McAfee Mobile Security,
which allows customers to . . . remotely wipe data on devices if they’re lost or stolen.”).
141. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
142. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
143. James, 2008 WL 1925032, at *7 n.3 (“The service provider keeps records of the
incoming and outgoing calls.”); Orso, supra note 138, at 199. The Computer Crime and
Intellectual Property Section of the U.S. Department of Justice reported that call detail records
and text message details may be stored by a service provider for up to seven years, and text
message content for up to ninety days. Cell Phone Location Tracking Request Response—Cell
Phone Company Data Retention Chart, ACLU, http://www.aclu.org/cell-phone-locationtracking-request-response-cell-phone-company-data-retention-chart (last visited Oct. 3, 2012).
144. Jacob Leibenluft, Do Text Messages Live Forever? How a Dirty SMS Can Come Back to
Haunt You, SLATE (May 1, 2008, 6:51 PM), www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/
explainer/2008/05/do_text_messages_live_forever.html. Data occupy a certain “location” on a
memory storage device, and they are not actually erased from the device’s memory until new
information needs to use the same memory “location” and replaces the old information. Id.
145. Id.
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recovering deleted data off old phones and other portable electronic
devices.146 For example, companies such as Cellebrite offer a mobile
forensic device capable of extracting existing, hidden, and deleted
data.147
Programs for computers, such as “Evidence Eliminator,” go a
step further than cell phones do by not only deleting any previously
existing computer data but also overwriting the computer’s memory
with random data.148 Analogous programs for cell phones arguably
make data on cell phones volatile and justify searches of cell phones
incident to arrest based on the need to prevent the destruction of
evidence.
However, computer forensics experts are able to recover data
that have been overwritten by many layers of new data.149
Considering the natural progression of technology and the increasing
similarity between modern cell phones and computers,150 computer
forensic experts are likely to soon be able to recover overwritten data
from cell phones. Additionally, cell phone programs are dependent
on a user or signal to initiate them.151 Put differently, if an officer is
able to prevent a cell phone from receiving a signal, an individual is
powerless to eliminate the data on that device. Therefore, programs
cannot destroy the data if officers seize an arrestee’s phone and
either remove the battery or place the cell phone in an area where it
cannot receive a signal.152 Moreover, cutting off a cell phone’s signal
would be far more effective at preserving evidence than would the
officer browsing through a cell phone’s contents contemporaneously

146. See generally, WAYNE JANSEN & RICK AYERS, GUIDELINES ON CELL PHONE
FORENSICS: RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND
TECHNOLOGY 13–23 (2007), available at http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-101/
SP800-101.pdf (generally describing the capabilities of the tools available to law enforcement for
the purposes of recovering data from cell phones and other portable devices).
147. UFED Ultimate, CELLEBRITE, http://www.cellebrite.com/mobile-forensics-products/
forensics-products/ufed-ultimate.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2012).
148. Daniel Engber, Can You Ever Really Erase a Computer File? What If You Use Evidence
Eliminator?, SLATE (June 29, 2005), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/explainer/
2005/06/can_you_ever_really_erase_a_computer_file.html.
149. Id.
150. See, e.g., Martyn Williams, Samsung Phone Features a Hard Drive: Windows-based
Cell Phone Includes 3GB Hard Drive for Storage, PCWORLD (Mar. 10, 2005), www.pc
world.com/article/119961/samsung_phone_features_a_hard_drive.html.
151. Jamie Lendino, Kill Your Phone Remotely, PCMAG (Sept. 11, 2009), http://www.pc
mag.com/article2/0,2817,2352755,00.asp#fbid=2WAnUDlh8gk.
152. Id.
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with the arrest because it would ensure that the arrestee cannot
actually delete the data on a cell phone.
Arguably, there will be rare circumstances in which evidence
contained on a cell phone could be destroyed, such as when forensic
experts cannot recover overwritten data. However, the Court has
been, and should be, guided by general circumstances rather than
anecdotal outliers when it sets out to establish the procedural rules
relating to the Fourth Amendment and specifically searches incident
to arrest.153 Absent rare circumstances, cell phones generally will not
implicate the government’s interest of preserving evidence.
Therefore, cell phones, as a category, cannot implicate the need
to prevent the destruction of evidence. Unlike physical objects and
containers, the data stored in cell phones cannot be irrevocably lost
because they are available through alternative sources and can be
recovered via current forensic devices.
4. Excluding Cell Phones from
Robinson’s Bright-Line Rule
Will Not Create Confusion
Arguably, excluding electronic data from Robinson’s bright-line
rule would force officers to engage in fact-specific inquiries while in
the field, which would be inconsistent with the Court’s policy
favoring clear and easily applied rules. Although legitimate, this
concern is generally inapposite in the context of electronic data.
Criminal procedure values the “clarity and certainty” provided
by a “one size fits all” rule.154 Key search-incident-to-arrest decisions
have relied on this governing principle, noting that an ambiguous
rule will impede the enforcement of the law just as much as
ambiguous facts.155 Fact-sensitive exceptions to firm rules have the
potential to create uncertainty, but exceptions based on objective

153. See J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2403 (2011) (accounting for the general
characteristics of children rather than looking at the specific characteristics of the child in
question); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001) (quoting Dunaway v. New
York, 442 U.S. 200, 208 (1979)).
154. J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2408–09 (Alito, J., dissenting); Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S.
615, 623 (2004).
155. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 459–60 (1981); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S.
218, 235 (1974).

Summer 2012]

PAY PHONE PROTECTIONS

1373

characteristics that are generally applicable to a whole class will not
impede the clarity of a rule.156
As discussed above, cell phones do not implicate the twin
justifications for searches incident to arrest.157 The fact that a cell
phone’s data cannot be used as a weapon and are recoverable despite
deletion are objective characteristics about cell phones that are
generally applicable to all cell phones. Accordingly, a holding that
exempts cell-phone searches from a rule of per se reasonableness
will not impede the clarity of the rules that govern searches incident
to arrest. The policy rationales underlying Robinson’s bright-line rule
do not compel courts to treat cell phones as “containers.”
B. Cell Phones Are Entitled to
Heightened Protections Due to the
Intrusiveness of a Cell-Phone Search
When assessing the reasonableness of an exception to the
warrant and probable cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment,
the Supreme Court balances the government’s interest in crime
prevention with society’s privacy interests.158 When officers
undertake more intrusive searches, the Supreme Court has often
required a stricter adherence to the Fourth Amendment.159
When balancing the public and private interests to determine the
reasonableness of a search, the Court often considers what, if any,
expectation of privacy was invaded and whether the search was
justified by the government’s needs.160 Courts evaluating searches of
cell phones incident to arrest have relied on two primary
justifications: 1) there is a decreased expectation of privacy
following an arrest that justifies a full search of the arrestee’s
person,161 and 2) a “lawful custodial arrest justifies the infringement
of any privacy interest the arrestee may have.”162

156. See J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2403–04.
157. See supra Part III.A.iii.
158. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20–22 (1968).
159. See, e.g., Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2642 (2009);
United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 541 (1985).
160. See, e.g., Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 539–40.
161. People v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501, 506 (Cal. 2011) (citing United States v. Chadwick, 433
U.S. 1, 16 n.10 (1977)), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 94 (2011).
162. Id. at 507 (citing New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460–61 (1981)).
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1. Arrestees Do Not Have
a Decreased Expectation of
Privacy in Cell Phones
Courts have ignored the attributes of items seized during a
search incident to arrest because the Supreme Court has justified
those searches on the grounds that there is a decreased expectation of
privacy following an arrest.163 However, the constitutionally
recognized principles that justify a reduced expectation of privacy
during searches incident to arrest should not apply to cell-phone
searches.
The Court has stated various circumstances that reduce an
individual’s expectation of privacy,164 including when invasions of
privacy occur due to governmental needs that exceed general
criminal investigations.165 For example, courts have found that
administrative searches may justify investigative searches.166
However, the Court has often held that one justified invasion of
privacy for the purposes of criminal investigation cannot alone
authorize additional investigative searches.167
Courts have repeatedly stated that searches of an individual’s
person incident to arrest are justified by a reduced expectation of
privacy.168 However, the Court has failed to provide a valid

163. See id. at 506.
164. See, e.g., Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 537–39.
165. See, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 657 (1995) (stating that
student athletes have a reduced expectation of privacy because trying out for the team means
being subjected to a degree of regulation that requires a preseason physical exam, adequate
insurance coverage, a minimum grade point average, and compliance with additional rules of
conduct); Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cnty. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822,
830–31 (2007) (stating that schoolchildren have a reduced expectation of privacy due to school
regulations that require routine physical examinations and vaccinations); New York v. Burger,
482 U.S. 691, 703–07 (1987) (stating that a vehicle-dismantling junkyard has a reduced
expectation of privacy due to heavy regulations that subject businesses to meet registration
requirements, obtain a license, and make records and inventory available to inspection by the
police or an agent of the Department of Motor Vehicles).
166. See Burger, 482 U.S. at 702 (stating that industries subject to inspection have a
weakened expectation of privacy).
167. See, e.g., Flippo v. West Virginia, 528 U.S. 11, 14 (1999) (stating that an investigation of
a murder scene at a home does not authorize a general warrantless search of that home for
investigative purposes).
168. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 16 n.10 (1977); United States v. Edwards, 415
U.S. 800, 808–09 (1974); People v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501, 506 (Cal. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct.
94 (2011).
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constitutional justification for this conclusion.169 In light of cases that
have recognized a heightened expectation of privacy of the
individual’s person as compared to the areas within an individual’s
reach,170 the absence of such a justification is strikingly troubling.171
The Court in Robinson stated only that a lawful arrest destroys
the arrestee’s right to privacy to justify an officer’s per se authority
to search an arrestee.172 However, as the dissent pointed out, Chimel
rejected the proposition that one lawful intrusion would justify
additional intrusions.173 As the Court in Chimel stated, “[We] can see
no reason why, simply because some interference with an
individual’s privacy and freedom of movement has lawfully taken
place, further intrusions should automatically be allowed despite the
absence of a warrant that the Fourth Amendment would otherwise
require.”174 Therefore, another constitutionally recognized reason
must exist to justify the decreased expectation of privacy.
The Robinson Court also stated that “a search incident to a
lawful arrest is a traditional exception to the warrant requirement.”175
The Court has recognized traditional intrusions as an arena that
would warrant a reduced expectation of privacy.176 However,
justifying a search on the grounds of a reduced expectation of
privacy caused by the search itself would be unacceptable

169. See, e.g., Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 16 n.10; Edwards, 415 U.S. at 809 (quoting United
States v. DeLeo, 422 F.3d 487, 493 (1st Cir. 1970)); DeLeo, 422 F.3d at 493. All three cases state
that an arrestee has a reduced expectation of privacy, but none explains the reason for that
conclusion.
170. See Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 308 (1999) (Breyer, J., concurring); United
States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 587 (1948).
171. Di Re, 332 U.S. at 587 (explaining that a permissible search of a home or car does not
include permission to search the occupants of the home or car even though an occupant could be
concealing evidence, because “mere presence” is not sufficient to strip an individual of
“immunities from search of his person to which he would otherwise be entitled”).
172. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) (stating that “[i]t is the fact of
the lawful arrest which establishes the authority to search and “a search incident to that arrest
requires no additional justification”); id. at 260 (Powell, J., concurring) (“I believe that an
individual lawfully subjected to a custodial arrest retains no significant Fourth Amendment
interest in the privacy of his person.”).
173. Id. at 256 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 766 n.12
(1969)).
174. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 767 n.12.
175. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 224.
176. See, e.g., United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616–17 (1977).
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“bootstrapping.”177 This reasoning also contradicts the reasoning in
Chimel.178
One viable explanation for a decreased expectation of privacy is
the administrative consequences of a full custodial arrest. An
inventory search is part of the administrative steps of
incarceration.179 An arrestee’s items may be searched pursuant to an
inventory search.180 In Illinois v. Lafayette,181 the Court upheld a
routine administrative search pursuant to standard police
procedures.182 It stated four governmental interests that support an
inventory search: (1) deterring false claims of lost property; (2)
reducing incidents of theft or carelessness; (3) preventing weapons
from being introduced to the prison system; and (4) helping police
identify the arrestee.183 In Florida v. Wells,184 the Court
reemphasized the administrative purpose behind inventory searches
by holding that police officers cannot have “uncanalized discretion,”
and it stated that inventory searches should be designed to “produce
an inventory” rather than a “general means of discovering evidence
of crime.”185
The governmental interests supporting an inventory search
would not justify a search of the electronic information contained
within devices like cell phones. A search designed to “produce an
inventory” in order to deter false claims of lost property and prevent
the introduction of dangerous instrumentalities would not require the
examination and cataloging of data within electronic devices.186
Although cataloging the device itself would fall within the scope of
the general interests of an inventory search, the data on a cell phone

177. See New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 720 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
178. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 766–67 n.12.
179. Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 644 (1983).
180. Id. at 648.
181. 462 U.S. 640 (1983).
182. Id.
183. Id. at 646–67.
184. 495 U.S. 1 (1990).
185. Id. at 4. Because standard procedures vary, the scope of an inventory search will vary
depending on the procedures in place. To address the underlying reasons that justify an inventory
search, this Note proceeds assuming that officers conduct every inventory search to the maximum
extent possible.
186. United States v. Park, No. CR 05-375 SI, 2007 WL 1521573, at *11 (N.D. Cal. 2007).
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could not possibly contain a dangerous instrumentality, be stolen, or
be the subject of a false claim.187
Arguably, searches of electronic media stored on devices could
help to identify the arrestee. However, inventory searches designed
to identify an arrestee have always involved situations in which an
arrestee could not be identified by other standard means.188
Therefore, absent special circumstances, police do not have general
authority to use an inventory search to discover identifying
information.
Additionally, any official policy that prefers the search of an
arrestee’s items to standard identification methods would strongly
indicate that its purpose was a “general means of discovering
evidence of crime” and would therefore be prohibited.189
Accordingly, an inventory search should not decrease an arrestee’s
expectation of privacy in the electronic contents of his or her cell
phone because law enforcement officials do not have a general
authority to search the data within cell phones to recover identifying
information.
The Court has cited a decreased expectation of privacy to justify
searches of an individual’s person incident to arrest,190 but it has not
articulated a clear reason for why an arrest should result in a
decreased expectation of privacy. The only rational justification for
such a conclusion has no bearing on the expectations of privacy in
electronic data contained on cell phones. Thus, the reduced
expectation of privacy is merely “a subjective view regarding the
acceptability of certain sorts of police conduct”191 and is an
unjustified argument. Furthermore, the only viable argument for a
reduced expectation of privacy does not apply to the contents of a
cell phone. As a result, to be constitutionally reasonable, a
187. See, e.g., United States v. Wall, No. 08-60016-CR., 2008 WL 5381412, at *4 (S.D. Fla.
2011); Park, 2007 WL 1521573, at *11.
188. See Commonwealth v. Bowen, 223 N.E.2d 391, 393–94 (Mass. 1967) (upholding a
search when the defendant did not have a driver’s license and vehicle registration information
was inaccessible at that time); State v. Scroggins, 210 N.W.2d 55, 57–58 (Minn. 1973)
(upholding a search of the defendant’s pocket, which yielded his billfold, when he refused to
present identification); State v. Jewell, 469 N.W.2d 247, 1991 WL 74161, at *1 (Wis. Ct. App.
1991) (upholding search of contents of abandoned car when license plates did not match
registration information).
189. Wells, 495 U.S. at 4.
190. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 16 n.10 (1977).
191. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 764–65 (1969).
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sufficiently strong governmental interest must overcome the privacy
interest of arrestees.
2. Individuals Have
a Greater Expectation of
Privacy in Cell Phones
Robinson and its progeny minimize the privacy interests at
stake. However, this does not mean that the Court failed to consider
the intrusiveness of searches when deciding these cases. Rather, the
Court considered only objects limited by their physical
characteristics in concluding that a categorical authority to search
incident to arrest would involve a minimal intrusion on the privacy
interests of individuals.192 The Court arrived at this conclusion
because physical containers that can be immediately associated with
the person of an arrestee are small, and their physical capacity
inherently limited the intrusiveness of warrantless searches incident
to arrest.193 This assumption likely led the Court to conclude without
proof that, absent rare circumstances, searches of vehicles would
rarely create a significant intrusion on the privacy of individuals.194
However, modern cell phones are regularly used for the most
intimate aspects of an individual’s life and surpass the inherent
limitations and boundaries of physical containers.195
Recent decisions have recognized that modern cell phones have
the capacity to store vast amounts of information and often contain
“the most sensitive kinds of personal information, in which
individuals may reasonably have a substantial expectation of privacy

192. See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236 (1973) (addressing the search of
a cigarette package); Belton v. New York, 453 U.S. 454, 461 n.4 (1981) (explicitly defining a
container as any object capable of holding another object).
193. See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 574 (1991) (stating that requiring officers to
obtain a warrant before searching a paper sack found in a vehicle during a valid vehicle search
would “provide[] only minimal protection for privacy and have impeded effective law
enforcement”).
194. Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 303 (1999) (quoting Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S.
583, 590 (1974)). The Court subsequently retreated from this characterization in Arizona v. Gant,
129 S. Ct. 1710, 1720 (2009).
195. City of Ontario, Cal. v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2630 (2010); Ben E. Stewart, Cell Phone
Searches Incident to Arrest: A New Standard Based on Arizona v. Gant, 99 KY. L.J. 579, 580
(2011).
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and for which the law offers heightened protection.”196 Even the
Supreme Court has recognized the intimate nature of cell phones,
stating that “[c]ell phone and text message communications are so
pervasive that some persons may consider them to be essential means
or necessary instruments for self-expression, even selfidentification.”197 This characterization is particularly relevant for
teenagers who have grown up in the digital age. Surveys show that
over 75 percent of teenagers carry a cell phone on a daily basis and
use text messaging as a way to communicate personal matters.198
These teens commonly use cell phones for private communication
and will likely continue to use their cell phones in this manner into
adulthood.199
Moreover, the data within electronic devices can increase even
after the arrestee is no longer in control of them.200 For instance,
police officers have answered a defendant’s cell phone when the
phone received an incoming call after the defendant’s arrest.201
Officers have also used cell phones to obtain additional evidence
against an arrestee through incoming text messages received after the
arrest.202 Some phones are able to automatically retrieve e-mails and
196. Smallwood v. State, 61 So. 3d 448, 461 (Fl. Dist. Ct. App. 2011), cert. granted, 68 So.
3d 235 (Fla. 2011) (citing Hawkins, 704 S.E.2d 886, 891 (Ga. App. Ct. 2010)); Hawkins, 704
S.E.2d at 891, aff’d, 723 S.E.2d (Ga. 2012); see also People v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501, 513 (Cal.
2011) (Werdegar, J., dissenting) (“A contemporary smartphone can hold hundreds or thousands
of messages, photographs, videos, maps, contacts, financial records, memoranda and other
documents, as well as records of the user’s telephone calls and Web browsing. Never before has it
been possible to carry so much personal or business information in one’s pocket or purse.”), cert.
denied, 132 S. Ct. 84 (2011); United States v. Park, No. CR 05-375 SI, 2007 WL 1521573, at *8
(N.D. Cal. May 23, 2007); Oxton, supra note 59, at 1201 (stating that modern cell phones can
store massive amounts of private information and describing the capabilities of the iPhone 3GS).
197. Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2630.
198. Amy Vorenberg, Indecent Exposure: Do Warrantless Searches of a Student’s Cell
Phone Violate the Fourth Amendment?, 17 BERKLEY J. CRIM. L. 62, 63, 78 (2012).
199. Cf. Press Release, CTIA, National Study Reveals How Teens Are Shaping & Reshaping
Their Wireless World. Study Sheds New Light on Teens’ Cell Phone Habits, Expectations &
Dream Phone Wishes (Sept. 12, 2008), available at http://ctia.org/media/press/body.cfm/prid/
1774 (describing how cellular telephones have impacted teenagers and their expectations for the
future).
200. See State v. Carroll, 778 N.W.2d 1, 12 (Wis. 2010); see also United States v. Gomez,
807 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1137–39 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (describing an officer answering a call received
after he had seized the cell phone and using the defendant’s cell phone to exchange text messages
with a third party); United States v. Davis, 787 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1169 (D. Or. 2011) (describing
an officer answering a call that was received after the officer had seized the defendant’s phone).
201. Gomez, 807 F. Supp. 2d at 1138–39; Davis, 787 F. Supp. 2d 1165; Carroll, 778 N.W.2d
at 12.
202. Gomez, 807 F. Supp. 2d at 1139–40.
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other data,203 which is yet another feature that police officers may
take advantage of when investigating arrestees.204 Therefore,
electronic devices are further distinguished from any of their
physical counterparts because the content of electronic devices may
potentially expand, even when an arrestee is already in police
custody.
Cell phones do not comport with the physical limitations of
standard containers contemplated in Robinson; their contents are not
limited by the physical restrictions in the way that the contents of
standard containers are, making cell-phone searches a far greater
invasion of privacy than searches of standard containers. With the
infinite amount of private data contained on a cell phone and its
ability to continue to collect additional private information, a search
of a cell phone’s data would likely be a severe intrusion into the most
intimate details of a person’s life.205 Accordingly, the cell phone
should be subject to a heightened expectation of privacy.
3. The Government’s Interest
Fails to Overcome the
Heightened Expectation of Privacy
Although Belton categorically stated that “[a] lawful custodial
arrest justifies the infringement of any privacy interest,”206 Belton
explicitly defined a container as “any object capable of holding
another object.”207 While cases have relied on Belton’s rationale to
authorize searches of the contents of cell phones,208 physical
containers have inherent limitations that make searches of them far
less intrusive than searches of cell phones. Therefore, an analysis of
a cell-phone search that relies on the Belton rationale would be
shallow and faulty because it would ignore key distinguishing

203. See iPhone, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/batteries/iphone.html (last visited Oct. 22,
2011) (discussing how reducing data and e-mail retrieval may extend battery life).
204. See Gomez, 807 F. Supp. 2d at 1139–40.
205. Smallwood v. State, 61 So. 3d 448, 461 (Fl. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (“[C]ell phones can
make the entirety of one’s personal life available for perusing by an officer every time someone is
arrested for any offense.”).
206. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 461 (1981).
207. Id. at 460 n.4.
208. See, e.g., People v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501, 507 (Cal. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 94
(2011); People v. Nottoli, 130 Cal. Rptr. 3d 884, 904 (Ct. App. 2011).
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features, namely the breadth and nature of information,209 at the heart
of Fourth Amendment concerns.
Furthermore, electronic devices do not implicate the policy
rationales underlying searches incident to arrest. Rather, searches of
cell phones incident to arrest require a novel examination of the
police and privacy interests at stake because such searches are not
tethered to the underlying rationales that originally justified the
search-incident-to-arrest doctrine.210
Few, if any, governmental interests support searching the data
on a cell phone incident to arrest. The only identifiable police
interests would be a need for a clear, bright-line rule that
encompasses the electronic data of cell phones and a greater
authority for crime prevention.211 However, the needs that justify a
bright-line rule are inapplicable in the cell-phone context because
cell phones do not present inherently ambiguous situations regarding
potential weapons or the potential destruction of evidence; excluding
cell phones would not blur the bright-line rule. Furthermore, the
remaining police interest in general crime prevention, although
compelling, must yield to the Fourth Amendment.
On the other hand, the privacy interests at stake are
exceptionally high due to the intimate nature and sheer volume of the
content of cell phones.212 Cell phones implicate great privacy
concerns due to the breadth of information they contain and their
ability to continue to expand their content even when outside of the
owner’s control.213
A fresh balancing of the governmental and privacy interests
shows that the blanket authority to search a cell phone incident to
arrest is not reasonable. Cell phones implicate heightened privacy
concerns demanding greater Fourth Amendment protections.
Additionally, they do not trigger the concerns about officer safety
and loss of evidence that justify other searches incident to an arrest.
Finally, the police interest in bright-line rules does not provide a
209. Smallwood, 61 So. 3d at 461.
210. See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 343–46 (2009).
211. See Belton, 453 U.S. at 459–60 (stating that citizens cannot know the scope of their
constitutional rights and that police officers cannot know the scope of their authority when a
doctrine is not settled); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) (stating that officer
decisions are usually ad hoc decisions and need not be subsequently scrutinized by the courts).
212. See supra Part III.B.2.
213. See supra Part III.B.2.
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strong argument for a categorical authority to search cell phones
incident to arrest. One court agreed, stating the following:
The bright-line rule established by Robinson may have been
prudent at the time, given the finite amount of personal
information an arrestee could carry on his or her person or
within his or her reach. However, the Robinson court could
not have contemplated the nearly infinite wealth of personal
information cell phones and other similar electronic devices
can hold.214
4. The Fourth Amendment
Requires a Retreat from
Robinson’s Unqualified Authority
to Search Cell Phones Incident to Arrest
A principal purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to prohibit
general warrants that authorize police officers to arbitrarily search
individuals.215 The bright-line rule in Robinson, when combined with
the vast amount of information that can be accessed by cell phones,
enables officers to engage in the “unrestrained and thoroughgoing
examination of [an arrestee] and his [or her] personal effects” that
the Chimel Court condemned.216 The current rules governing
searches incident to arrest essentially authorize and encourage such
behavior, which is antithetical to the principles behind the Fourth
Amendment.
A significant risk of abuse arises when the wealth of information
stored in cell phones collides with the broad authority of police
officers to search an arrestee incident to arrest.217 The evidentiary
interest supporting searches incident to arrest is virtually limitless218
and essentially authorizes the type of unrestricted search that Judge
214. Smallwood, 61 So. 3d at 461.
215. Gant, 556 U.S. at 345 (“A rule that gives police the power to conduct [an unjustified]
search . . . creates a serious and recurring threat to the privacy of countless individuals. Indeed,
the character of that threat implicates the central concern underlying the Fourth Amendment—the
concern about giving police officers unbridled discretion to rummage at will among a person’s
private effects.”); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 761 (1969).
216. See Chimel, 395 U.S. at 764 (quoting Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 67 (1967)).
217. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring); United
States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 248 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting); see Chimel, 395 U.S. at
767–68.
218. 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 5.2 (4th ed. 2011).
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Learned Hand stated was “indistinguishable from what might be
done under a general warrant.”219 The dissent in Robinson
recognized that granting a broad authority to conduct investigative
searches provides police officers with a tremendous incentive to
arrest individuals for minor offenses, such as traffic violations, as a
pretext to search for evidence of other offenses without a warrant.220
Furthermore, because searching privately-owned cell phones is
inexpensive,221 this authority is even more susceptible to abuse
because it escapes one of “the ordinary checks that constrain abusive
law enforcement practices: limited police resources.”222 Worse yet,
even though the courts have recognized the impropriety of using
arrests as a pretext to search for evidence,223 the Court in Whren v.
United States224 essentially eliminated any legal prohibitions on such
a practice and has left private citizens without a remedy.225
IV. PROPOSAL
The expansion of the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine seems to
reflect a judicial reluctance to exclude credible evidence.226 The
cases that expand the search-incident-to-arrest exception have always
involved situations in which the admissibility of evidence was highly
probative of a defendant’s guilt.227 These decisions were likely
colored by the potential consequence of “set[ting] the criminal loose
in the community without punishment.”228 Under these
circumstances, the judiciary’s willingness to narrow procedural
protections is not surprising.229 Even lower courts that disagree with

219. United States v. Kirschenblatt, 16 F.2d 202, 203 (2d Cir. 1926).
220. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 248 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
221. Cf. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (discussing GPS tracking as
opposed to traditional police surveillance).
222. Id. (quotation marks omitted) (citing Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 426 (2004)).
223. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 248 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
224. 517 U.S. 806.
225. See id. at 812–13.
226. Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2427 (2011) (“Exclusion exacts a heavy toll on
both the judicial system and society at large . . . [because] its bottom-line effect, in many cases, is
to suppress the truth and set the criminal loose in the community without punishment.”).
227. See, e.g., New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 456 (1981) (finding evidence of cocaine in
a jacket); Robinson, 414 U.S. at 222–23 (finding evidence of heroin within a cigarette package).
228. Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2427.
229. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 457 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The cost of
suppressing evidence of guilt will always make the value of a procedural safeguard appear
‘minimal,’ ‘marginal,’ or ‘incremental.’ . . . The individual interest in procedural safeguards that
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Supreme Court precedent often hesitate to distinguish cases.230 This
attitude resulted in the doctrine that wholly departs from the
principles of the Fourth Amendment, a problem that can now be
remedied only at the Supreme Court level.231
Although cell phones have been the primary focus of recent
decisions, the same analogies seen in cell-phone cases have been
applied to other devices, though not in the context of searches
incident to arrest. Courts have already justified searches of other
advanced technologies by applying poor functional analogies or
disregarding their characteristics.232 To restore fidelity to the Fourth
Amendment, the Supreme Court must make a new doctrine for
electronic devices that (1) prohibits courts from applying outdated
approaches to modern technologies and (2) restricts the tremendous
potential for abuse. Without a rule that restricts searches of the data
stored on cell phones and other technological devices in the future,
citizens will be “at the mercy of advancing technology.”233 However,
the rule must maintain clarity and eliminate the need for officers to
conduct a fact-sensitive inquiry in order to determine the scope of
their authority.
minimize the risk of error is easily discounted when the fact of guilt appears certain beyond
doubt.”).
230. See, e.g., Smallwood v. State, 61 So. 3d 448, 460 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011), cert.
granted, 68 So. 3d 235 (Fla. 2011); People v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501, 517 (Cal. 2011) (stating that if
precedents need to be reevaluated to account for modern technology, only the Supreme Court
may do so), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 94 (2011). But see State v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d 949, 955 (Ohio
2009).
231. See, e.g., Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1721 (2009) (rejecting the broad reading of
Belton as an “anathema to the Fourth Amendment”).
232. United States v. Williams, 592 F.3d 511, 523 (4th Cir. 2010) (“[T]he sheer amount of
information contained on a computer does not distinguish the authorized search of the computer
from an analogous search of a file cabinet containing a large number of documents.”); United
States v. Arnold, 533 F.3d 1003, 1009–10 (9th Cir. 2008) (upholding the suspicionless search of a
laptop at the border because the quality and nature of a laptop is irrelevant to the Fourth
Amendment analysis). But see United States v. Giberson, 527 F.3d 882, 888 (9th Cir. 2008)
(quoting United States v. Walser, 275 F.3d 981, 986 (10th Cir. 2001)) (“[B]ecause computers can
hold so much information touching on many different areas of a person’s life, there is a greater
potential for the intermingling of documents and a consequent invasion of privacy when police
execute a search for evidence on a computer.” (original quotation marks and brackets omitted));
United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1275 (10th Cir. 1999) (stating that analogizing a computer
to a file cabinet “may be inadequate,” and that relying on such analogies “may lead courts to
oversimplify a complex area of Fourth Amendment Doctrines and ignore the realities of massive
modern computer storage” (quoting Raphael Winick, Searches and Seizures of Computers and
Computer Data, 8 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 75, 104 (1994)) (original quotation marks omitted)).
233. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 35 (2001).
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Though scholars have advanced many proposals, they fail to
address the concerns that attend to searches incident to arrest in the
modern era. The most effective approach to restore fidelity to Fourth
Amendment principles would be to restrict the applicability of
Robinson and its progeny to physical containers only and to address
new technologies based on general Fourth Amendment principles
that govern searches incident to arrest.
A. Flaws of Prior Proposals
Prior proposals that address searches of digital media on cell
phones fail to account for one or more of the concerns stated above.
One scholar suggests drawing a distinction between older generation
cell phones and new “smartphones,” requiring a warrant for
“smartphones” and distinguishing between coding and content-based
information stored on older cell phones.234 The scholar further
suggests using the presence of a touch screen or a full keyboard as
“an easily ascertainable line of distinction.”235
Although this suggestion proposes a seemingly clear rule, cell
phones are constantly evolving and its distinction may not be
relevant in the near future.236 Already, over two thousand cell phone
models are available in the United States alone.237 Additionally, this
distinction presupposes that older generation cell phones lack the
storage capacity and access to information of new generation cell
phones.238 Moreover, this rule would be impractical because it would
require police officers to determine whether a phone is new or old
generation.239
Other suggestions include (1) limiting the search to a set number
of “steps,” in which, for example, opening a file would constitute a
step, or (2) distinguishing between data stored on the device and

234. Orso, supra note 138, at 221–22. Orso defines coding information as data that “reveals
only the identity of a party to a communication without disclosing the subject matter of that
communication.” Id. at 188. He also defines content-based information as “the subject matter of a
communication as well as privately stored data reserved for one’s personal use.” Id. at 193.
235. Id. at 222.
236. Snyder, supra note 140, at 181.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 181–82.
239. State v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d 949, 954 (2009) (“[I]t would not be helpful to create a rule
that requires officers to discern the capabilities of a cell phone before acting accordingly.”).
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remotely stored data that are accessible from the device.240 However,
both of these suggestions are severely flawed.
The “steps” approach has no constitutional basis, is entirely
arbitrary, and would lead to “fuzzy inquiries” regarding what
constitutes a step.241 Furthermore, there would be no principled way
to determine the appropriate number of steps. In addition, this
method presupposes that more private data take more “steps” to
access. However, because private data are often located in commonly
used features, such as e-mail, text messaging, call logs, and stored
phone numbers,242 phones can be configured to provide quick access
to those features.243
Permitting searches incident to an arrest based on where the data
are actually stored creates practical problems. Officers would be
required to understand how cell phones store data, and certain pieces
of data would blur the lines. For instance, if a cell phone accesses
e-mails and stores them locally for quick access, would this data be
considered locally or remotely stored? The potential ambiguities
make this approach impractical, and an officer is ill equipped to
distinguish between remote and local data without specialized
knowledge that is most likely outside of his or her area of expertise.
Others have proposed a rule that follows Arizona v. Gant.244
Gant addressed vehicle searches incident to arrest and crafted a rule
based on “circumstances unique to the automobile context.”245 The
Court authorized searches of vehicles incident to arrest in situations
in which an arrestee could still reach the passenger compartment of a
vehicle or the officer had a reasonable belief that “evidence of the
offense of arrest might be found in the vehicle.”246
Although this rule may be appropriate in the vehicle context,
this standard could be susceptible to abuse when applied to cell
phones. The breadth of information stored in a cell phone, especially

240. Gershowitz, supra note 34, at 54–57. Gershowitz also discusses other potential solutions
in his paper that are not discussed in this Note. Id. at 45–57.
241. Id. at 54–55.
242. City of Ontario, Cal. v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2630 (2010).
243. E.g., Windows Phone: Pin Things to Start, MICROSOFT, http://www.microsoft.com/
windowsphone/en-us/howto/wp7/start/pin-things-to-start.aspx (last visited Feb. 28, 2012).
244. 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009); Stewart, supra note 195, at 598.
245. Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1714.
246. Id.
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its stored communications, would allow officers to claim that they
reasonably believed that an arrestee’s cell phone contained evidence
of the crime. For example, an officer could claim that an arrestee’s
cell phone contained communications with suspected accomplices.
Thus, this standard is susceptible to abuse and may not provide a
meaningful constraint on police authority. Furthermore, a
reasonableness standard involves a fact-based analysis that does not
clearly define the scope of an officer’s authority.
Another scholar proposed that courts follow State v. Smith,
which categorically prohibits warrantless searches of cell phones
incident to arrest and forces officers to rely on other traditional
exigencies.247 The California legislature took a similar approach with
SB 914.248 The limitations on police conduct pursuant to SB 914
would be similar to the holding in State v. Smith, in that officers
would not be able to search a cell phone without a warrant or an
exigent circumstance.249
Although both Smith and SB 914 are steps in the right direction,
the categorical prohibition of warrantless cell-phone searches fails to
address one of the core problems that taints the current jurisprudence
of cell-phone searches incident to arrest: the tendency of courts to
poorly analogize novel technologies to standard containers in an
effort to bring them within the scope of Robinson.
B. A Simple and Effective Approach
to Reconnect Searches Incident to Arrest
with Fourth Amendment Principles
In order to reconnect searches incident to arrest with Fourth
Amendment principles, the Supreme Court must take a more drastic
approach than simply limiting the applicability of Robinson to cell
phones. It should restrict Robinson’s rule to physical containers only,
and when addressing novel technologies, courts should engage in a
fresh balancing of the interests at stake rather than analogize to
247. Snyder, supra note 140, at 180–81.
248. Amy Gahan, California Governor Allows Warrantless Search of Cell Phones, CNN
(Oct. 11, 2011), http://articles.cnn.com/2011-10-11/tech/tech_mobile_california-phone-searchveto_1_cell-phones-smartphone-text-messages?_s=PM:TECH. Governor Brown subsequently
vetoed this bill, much to the dismay of its supporters. Id.
249. State v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d 949, 956 (Ohio 2009); Bob Egelko, Bill Would Require
Warrant to Search Cell Phone, SF GATE (July 4, 2011, 4:00 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/cgibin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2011/07/04/BAQF1K3SVJ.DTL.
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precedent. Without a rule that restricts the application of old
precedents to novel technologies, citizens will be left “at the mercy
of advancing technology.”250
After Robinson, searches incident to arrest operated outside of
Fourth Amendment principles.251 When combined with the wealth of
private information stored on cell phones,252 Robinson created a
tremendous incentive to abuse searches incident to arrest.253
Furthermore, limited police resources will not provide a check on
this abuse, as officers can search privately-owned devices easily and
inexpensively.254 Restricting Robinson and its progeny to only
physical containers will minimize the incentive for officers to utilize
abusive tactics because it would prevent officers from accessing cell
phone data.
Additionally, this approach would still allow officers to engage
in reasonable searches. Physical containers are inherently ambiguous
and might contain hidden weapons that threaten an officer’s safety or
physical evidence that can be destroyed.255 These situations implicate
the twin concerns underlying a search incident to arrest,256 and the
inherent ambiguities surrounding physical containers necessitate a
bright line rule, especially when officer safety is at stake.257

250. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 35 (2001); see also United States v. Jones, 132 S.
Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (questioning whether old Fourth Amendment
doctrines are “ill suited to the digital age”).
251. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973); id. at 239 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (“In the present case, however, the majority turns its back on [Fourth Amendment]
principles, holding that ‘the fact of the lawful arrest’ always establishes the authority to conduct a
full search of the arrestee’s person, regardless of whether in a particular case ‘there was present
one of the reasons supporting the authority for a search of the person incident to a lawful
arrest.’”).
252. See, e.g., Smith, 920 N.E.2d at 955; see also Smallwood v. State, 61 So. 3d 448, 461
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (stating that cell phones and other electronic devices hold an “infinite
wealth of personal information”); Schlossberg v. Solesbee, 844 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1169 (D. Or.
Jan. 18, 2012) (stating that a rule authorizing searches of electronic devices incident to arrest
would put “any citizen . . . at risk of having his or her most intimate information viewed by an
arresting officer.”).
253. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“[T]he
Government’s unrestrained power to assemble data that reveal private aspects of identity is
susceptible to abuse.”).
254. Id. (citing Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 426 (2004)) (stating that limited police
resources is an ordinary constraint on abusive police conduct).
255. See supra Part III.A.2.
256. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762–63 (1969).
257. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234 n.5 (1973).
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Moreover, physical containers implicate minimal privacy
concerns. The physical dimensions of a container necessarily limit
the intrusiveness of a search,258 and containers are subject to a
decreased expectation of privacy because all physical items are
within the scope of an administrative inventory search.259 Therefore,
the broad authority to search physical containers is reasonable
because the police interests in preserving evidence, protecting
officers, and clarifying uncertain situations outweigh the privacy
interests at stake.
On the other hand, the balance of factors compels data stored on
cell phones to be categorically excluded from searches incident to
arrest.260 Electronic data on cell phones cannot hide weapons, and
any information they contain would be very difficult to erase
permanently.261 Remote wipe applications may increase the threat of
losing data, but an officer can remove the battery or cut off the signal
without searching the cell phone to address that risk.262 Because
electronic data fall outside the scope of an inventory search, they are
not subject to a reduced expectation of privacy. 263 Furthermore,
categorically excluding data stored on cell phones will not create
uncertainty because electronic data are clearly distinguishable from
the contents of a physical container.
This analysis strongly suggests that data on all electronic
devices should fall outside the scope of a search incident to arrest.
New technologies share many characteristics with modern cell
phones.264 Even older technologies, such as pagers, have advanced to
the point that the concerns expressed in United States v. Ortiz may be
outdated.265 Additionally, a rule that excludes all electronic devices
would eliminate the need for officers to categorize devices.
However, even without a blanket rule governing electronic devices,
an officer may address uncertain situations by obtaining a warrant
258. See supra Part III.A.1.
259. See supra Part III.B.1.
260. See supra Parts III.A.3 and III.B.1.
261. See supra Part III.A.3.
262. See supra Part III.A.3.
263. See supra Part III.B.1.
264. iPad: Technical Specifications, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/ipad/specs/ (last visited
Feb. 26, 2012).
265. United States v. Ortiz, 84 F.3d 977, 984 (7th Cir. 1996); see, e.g., Advisor II: Overview,
MOTOROLA, http://www.motorola.com/Business/US-EN/Business+Product+and+Services/TwoWay+Radios+and+Pagers+-+Business/Pagers/Advisor+II_US-EN (last visited Feb. 27, 2012).
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with minimal risk of evidence loss. If circumstances present a high
likelihood that evidence will be destroyed, an officer may still rely
on other exceptions to the warrant requirement.266
V. CONCLUSION
When old Fourth Amendment doctrines collide with modern
technologies, once-reasonable decisions create unreasonable results.
Prior courts crafted rules without considering the technologies
available today. Modern courts have continued to apply these
precedents but have not considered the implied limitations of prior
decisions that often make their reasoning inapplicable to the unique
qualities of modern technologies. When combined with a judicial
reluctance to exclude relevant evidence, doctrines expand and
deviate from Fourth Amendment principles. Searches incident to
arrest are no exception to this result and have been expanded to allow
officers to conduct highly invasive searches without any procedural
safeguards.
The Supreme Court must restrict the search-incident-to-arrest
doctrine so that searches of cell phones, and all future technologies,
do not become general warrants that authorize police officers to
intrude into the most intimate details of an individual’s life. The
Court must take action to ensure that modern devices do not
eviscerate the fundamental protections at the core of the Fourth
Amendment.

266. Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1856 (2011).

